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N.Y.C. SODA BAN MISCONCEPTIONS: WHY THE REAL ISSUE IS NOT FUNDAMENTAL
CHRISTINE MANSOUR

Introduction
As part of former Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s attempt to make New Yorkers healthier,
several initiatives were passed. Smoking is now prohibited in restaurants and bars, a trans-fat ban
was implemented throughout the entire city, and restaurants now post the calorie information of
their meals on menus.1 However one of his initiatives to combat obesity, the Portion Cap Rule or
as it is more commonly known the “Soda Ban,” has become the subject of much debate
throughout the country.
Many across the media including NPR, the New York Times, and Jon Stewart, have
derided and lauded the ban. 2 The ban has inspired so much discussion that the governor of
Mississippi in 2013, as a response to New York City’s Portion Cap Rule, signed a law to prevent
counties, districts, and towns from limiting portion sizes. 3 This law mandated that only the
legislature has the power to limit portion sizes because, as the governor claimed, “It is simply not
the role of the government to micro-regulate citizens.”4
The ban was passed in New York City by the Board of Health (“BOH”) and on its face
limits all sugary drinks to 16-ounce cups.5 The ban defines a sugary drink as a “carbonated or
non-carbonated beverage” that is non-alcoholic which was “sweetened by the manufacturer or

Michael Barbaro, Poll Shows New Yorkers Are Deeply Conflicted Over Bloomberg’s Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
25, 2013, at MB2.
2
Fred Mogul, Unlike Soda Tax, Bloomberg Says Big Soda Size Ban is His Call, WNYC, (May 31, 2012),
http://www.wnyc.org/story/213632-unlike-soda-tax-bloomberg-says-big-soda-size-ban-his-call/; Barbaro, supra
note 1; The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (Comedy Central television broadcast May 31, 2012), available at
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/thu-may-31-2012/drink-different---pick-your-poison.
3
Holly Yan, No soda ban here: Mississippi passes ‘Anti-Bloomberg’ bill, CNN, (Mar. 21, 2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/21/us/mississippi-anti-bloomberg-bill/.
4
Id.
5
Maximum Beverage Size, 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53 (2012).
1
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establishment with sugar or another caloric sweetener” containing more than “25 calories per 8
fluid ounces of beverage” and “does not contain more than 50 percent of milk or milk substitute
by volume as an ingredient.”6 Yet, the rule provides numerous drink and location exemptions.7 It
is not only the ban itself but also these exemptions that led to litigation based upon a claim that
the ban violated separation of powers and was arbitrary and capricious.8 The New York City
Department of Health & Mental Hygiene filed a motion for leave to appeal to the state’s highest
court, which was granted, citing five issues the court should consider in relation to the ban.9 Part
of the City’s argument was that the ban did not violate separation of powers nor was it arbitrary
and capricious. 10 The Court of Appeals of New York, in a 4-2 decision, affirmed the lower
courts’ findings that the ban violated separation of powers in New York and the BOH “exceeded
the scope of its regulatory authority by adopting the Portion Cap Rule.”11 Notably absent from all
court decisions, but foremost in the public debate, was the issue of whether the ban attempts to
regulate a fundamental liberty right: that of how much soda should the government allow citizens
to drink and by extension a free speech right wherein purchase power is akin to speech.
This Note argues that the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals of New York was
correct in determining that the BOH violated separation of powers.12 The Portion Cap Rule was
an attempt by former Mayor Bloomberg and the BOH to usurp the legislative authority of the
City Council, which was exclusively granted to the City Council in several N.Y.C. Charters. The
6

Id.
Id.
8
In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene,
2013 A.D. LEXIS 5423, at *15 (N.Y. App. Div. July 30, 2013) (did not decide on arbitrary and capricious nature
because the court determined it was invalid under separation of powers); In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic
Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2013 Misc. LEXIS 1216, at *35 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Mar. 11, 2013) (decided that the ban was arbitrary and capricious and violated separation of powers).
9
Respondents - Appellants’ Notice of Motion for Leave to Appeal to the N.Y. Court of Appeals at 4, (N.Y. 2013)
(No. 653584/12).
10
Id. at 2-3.
11 In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene,
2014 N.Y. LEXIS 1442, at *24-25 (N.Y. June 26, 2004).
12 Id.
7
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implications in N.Y.C. of what the City argued for would have granted the Mayor and the BOH
virtually unchecked legislative authority; this would be a clear violation of separation of powers
as executive administrative agencies are supposed to enforce but not create laws.
Part I of this Note gives an overview of the obesity epidemic, its causes, and how much
obesity-related healthcare costs. Part II examines the Portion Cap Rule itself and what the BOH
has exempted from the rule. Part III analyzes the authority that the legislature granted to the
BOH and what it actually allows the BOH to accomplish. Part IV discusses how the rule violated
separation of powers, failed the four factor Boreali test, was arbitrary and capricious, and thus
the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals of New York was proper. Part V discusses why the
issue in this case is not a fundamental liberty right and even if it were, the ban would nonetheless
be unconstitutional.
Part I: An Obesity Overview
A. The Obesity Epidemic in the United States
Obesity, and its subsequent diseases, is the leading cause of preventable death in the
United States, second only to smoking. 13 From 1990 to 2010, the obesity rates in America
dramatically increased. 14 Currently, more than a third of the American adult population is
considered obese and the number continues to rise across racial, educational, gender, and
socioeconomic demographics.15 Among children and adolescents obesity rates have tripled since

13

Mayor Bloomberg, Public Advocate DeBlasio, Manhattan Borough President Stringer, Montefiore Hospital CEO
Safyer, Deputy Mayor Gibbs and Health Commissioner Farley Highlight Health Impacts of Obesity, NYC.gov (June
5, 2012),
http://www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov/menuitem.c0935b9a57bb4ef3daf2f1c701c789a0/index.jsp?pageID=mayor_p
ress_release&catID=1194&doc_name=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2Fom%2Fhtml%2F2012a%2Fpr
200-12.html&cc=unused1978&rc=1194&ndi=1 (hereinafter Health Impacts of Obesity).
14
Adult Obesity Facts, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Aug. 16 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/adult.html.
15
What is Obesity?, OBESITY ACTION COALITION (2013), http://www.obesityaction.org/understandingobesity/obesity (defining obesity as “[A] condition that is associated with having an excess of body fat, defined by
genetic and environmental factors that are difficult to control when dieting… [H]aving a Body Mass Index (BMI) of
30 or greater.”); Adult Obesity Facts, supra note 14.
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1980; 17% of Americans aged 2-19 years old are now considered obese, making obesity the most
common disease in children.16 However, unlike adults, there is a gender and racial gap when it
comes to childhood obesity. Latino boys and African American girls are the populations most
impacted by this disease.17
The dangers associated with obesity are well known: it increases the risk for developing
heart disease, diabetes, and hypertension to name only a few of the numerous health related
consequences.18 In addition, there are numerous economic consequences to obesity not only for
the individual but also for the United States health care system at the local, state, and federal
levels. In 2008 alone, the total costs associated with obesity were over $157 billion; this includes
direct costs, like treatment services, indirect costs, like insurance, and costs provided by
Medicaid and Medicare. 19 The causes of obesity include a combination of several factors
including genetics, environment, such as driving instead of walking, and diseases.20 Of these, an
individual can only control the environmental factors, such as diet and exercise.
B. Obesity in NYC
As of 2007, 22% of New Yorkers were classified as obese, with the highest rates in the
poorer neighborhoods: 8.5% in Chelsea compared to 29.8% in East Harlem and more than 30%
in the South Bronx.21 The direct health care costs to the city to treat and manage obesity are $4

16

Data and Statistics, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Jan. 11, 2013),
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/childhood.html; What is Childhood Obesity?, OBESITY ACTION COALITION (2013)
http://www.obesityaction.org/understanding-obesity-in-children/what-is-childhood-obesity (defining childhood
obesity when a child’s BMI for age percentile is “[G]reater than 95 percent”).
17
Data and Statistics, supra note 16.
18
Causes and Consequences, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Apr. 27, 2012),
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/adult/causes/index.html.
19
Id.; In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 Misc. at *10.
20
Causes and Consequences, supra note 18.
21
Jennifer L. Black & James Macinko, The Changing Distribution and Determinants of Obesity in the
Neighborhoods of New York City, 2003-2007, 10 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1, 7 (2010).
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billion and rising each year. 22 An estimated 5,800 New Yorkers die each year due to
complications and diseases stemming from obesity. 23
Among children, specifically the poorest children, obesity rates are higher. 24 In 2006,
more than 40% of New York City’s children enrolled in the Head Start program had BMIs
classifying them as overweight or obese.25 For children, the dangers of childhood obesity are
compounded by the potential of a lifelong struggle with weight and the resulting diseases. Obese
children are more likely to develop Type II Diabetes at a younger age, suffer from asthma,
experience joint pain and discomfort, and are at a 70% increased risk for cardiovascular
disease. 26 Children who are overweight are more likely to become obese upon reaching
adulthood. These overweight children, upon becoming obese adults, will put a further strain on
the city’s health system in the future.27
C. Major Environmental Sources of Obesity: Where does it come from?
The rise in sugary drink consumption and portion sizes account, in large part, for the rise
in obesity. 28 Between the 1950s and today, the standard portion size of a sugary drink has
increased from between 6.5-12-ounces to a 42-ounce bottle made available in 2011. 29 This
increase in portion size has led to an increase in caloric intake from the sugary drinks.30 A 20-

22

Mike Bloomberg, Combating Obesity, MIKE BLOOMBERG
http://www.mikebloomberg.com/index.cfm?objectid=b7ee3b90-c29c-7ca2-fe35c0860a2075bd.
23
Id.
24
NYC Vital Signs – Obesity in Early Childhood, NYC.gov (Mar. 2006),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/survey/survey-2006childobesity.pdf.
25
Id.
26
Basics about Childhood Obesity, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Apr. 27, 2012),
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/childhood/basics.html.
27
Health Impacts of Obesity, supra note 13.
28
A Growing Problem, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Apr. 17, 2013),
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/childhood/problem.html; Sugary Drinks and Obesity Fact Sheet, HARVARD SCH. OF
PUBLIC HEALTH (2013), http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/nutritionsource/sugary-drinks-fact-sheet/; Brief for
Respondents-Appellants at 43, In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t
of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2013 A.D. 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (No. 653584/12).
29
Sugary Drinks and Obesity Fact Sheet, supra note 28.
30
Id.
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ounce soda can contain between 15-18 teaspoons of sugar and more than 240 calories, while a
64-ounce soda can have more than 700 calories.31 For instance, in 1955 a soda from McDonald’s
was 7-ounces, while today it can be 32-ounces or larger.32 This phenomenon is not limited to
McDonald’s; portion sizes in general have increased as well.33 For example, plate sizes have
increased from 9 to 12 inches coinciding with larger portions and a rise in obesity. 34 The
availability of larger portions thus encourages people to eat more.35
In addition, the beverage industry spends nearly half a billion dollars on advertising
targeting children ages 2-17.36 These children become lifetime consumers of sugary drinks, yet
they are also the ones hardest hit by the health impacts because they deal with a lifetime of
struggle with weight and related complications. Studies have shown that the greater an
individual’s consumption of sugary drinks, the more likely it is for that individual to be
overweight or obese. 37 This is due to the high sugar content and low satiety in the sugary
drinks.38 The danger with sugary beverages in particular is that the body does not recognize the
excess calories from sugar dissolved in water and this leads to additional calories being
consumed to satiate the appetite.39
D. Why target sugary drinks?

31

Id.
Brief for Respondents-Appellants, supra note 28, at 43.
33
A Growing Problem, supra note 28.
34
The Leonard Lopate Show: Please Explain: Calories, (WNYC Broadcast Sept. 20, 2013), available at
http://www.wnyc.org/story/please-explain-calories/.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Vasanti S. Malki et al., Intake of sugar-sweetened beverages and weight gain: a systematic review, 84 AM. J.
CLINICAL NUTRITION 274, 274 (2006).
38
Id.
39
Brief for Respondents – Appellants, supra note 28, at 42 (quoting the Chair of the Dep’t of Nutrition at Harvard
University’s Sch. of Public Health).
32
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Sugary drinks are a leading driver of obesity and the largest component of the additional
200-300 calories that Americans are consuming in comparison to 30 years ago.40 The former
Mayor and the Board of Health (“BOH”) decided that the government needed to address the
City’s rising obesity and diabetes rates.41 Due to the high consumption of sugary drinks and their
connection to weight gain, both the former Mayor and the BOH believed that a cap on sugary
drink portion sizes would be the best way to reduce obesity and diabetes rates of New Yorkers. 42
The Center for Disease Control, Let’s Move, and the American Heart Association, among others,
supported the former Mayor and the BOH’s efforts to reduce obesity by capping the portion size
of sugary drinks.43
To reinforce their view that capping the portion size of sugary drinks would be the best
way to combat obesity, the former Mayor and BOH cited several studies linking portion sizes
with the amount people eat claiming that when people are given “larger portions [they] will eat
more without recognizing that they are doing it.”44 However, the problem with the studies that
former Mayor Bloomberg and the BOH relied on is that the author of the studies found those
results when people were unknowingly given larger portions.45 When people are unknowingly
given more, they are unlikely to notice a change in portion size.46 However, when consumers
purchase a soda they are conscious of the size they are choosing to consume.47 People choose to

40

Id. at 42-44.
Susan Kansagra, Maximum Size for Sugary Drinks: Proposed Amendment of Article 81, NYC.gov (June 12,
2012), http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/boh/max_size_sugary_drinks_BOH.pdf; Brief for Respondents
– Appellants, supra note 28, at 41-45.
42
Kansagra, supra note 41.
43
Id.
44
Id.; Brief for Respondents – Appellants, supra note 28, at 41-45.
45
Brian Wansink & David Just, How Bloomberg’s Soft Drink Ban Will Backfire on NYC Public Health, THE
ATLANTIC (July 16, 2012, 2:35PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/06/how-bloombergs-softdrink-ban-will-backfire-on-nyc-public-health/258501/.
46
Id.
47
Id.
41
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purchase the 20, 48, or 64-ounce size sodas or refill their cups.48 The former Mayor and the BOH
cite as a primary reason for the soda ban the fact that they believe that the government has a
compelling interest in preventing obesity.49
Part II. What is the ban and what are the exemptions?
The rule in controversy is 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53, which places a limit on the maximum
size cup that a food service establishment (“FSE”) can offer to customers.50 The rule is former
Mayor Bloomberg’s and the Board of Health’s response to the obesity epidemic that is striking
New York City at the moment. 51 The rule defines a sugary drink as a “carbonated or noncarbonated beverage” that is non-alcoholic, “sweetened by the manufacturer or establishment
with sugar or another caloric sweetener,” that has more than “25 calories per 8 fluid ounces of
beverage,” and “does not contain more than 50 percent of milk or milk substitute by volume as
an ingredient.” 52 The rule further stipulates that the volume of milk or milk substitute is
“presumed to be less than or equal to 50 percent unless proven otherwise by the food service
establishment serving it.”53 Milk substitute has been defined as “any liquid that is soy-based and
is intended by its manufacturer to be a substitute for milk.”54 The rule also defines the maximum
cup size that FSEs are allowed to sell.55 FSEs are unable to “sell, offer, or provide a sugary drink
in a cup or container that is able to contain more than 16 fluid ounces,” yet FSEs may also not

48

Id.
Id.
50
Maximum Beverage Size, 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53 (2013) (This was added by resolution to Article 81 in September
2012. Enforcement has never occurred due to an injunction issued by Judge Tingling. It was struck from the code
due to the decision from the Court of Appeals of New York).
51
Brief for Respondents – Appellants, supra note 28, at 2.
52
24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53(1).
53
24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53.
54
24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53(2).
55
24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53(3).
49
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“sell, offer, or provide to any customer a self-service cup or container that is able to contain more
than 16 fluid ounces.”56
It is first important to note that the rule does not apply to beverages mixed with alcohol.57
Other drinks exempted under the rule include 100 percent fruit juices, fruit smoothies,
milkshakes, and mixed coffee drinks.58 The next exemption in the rule is that soymilk is the only
liquid allowed as a milk substitute, ruling out other milk substitutes such as rice, almond, or
coconut milk.59
On its face the rule appears to apply to all FSEs as defined under 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.03(s)
but the BOH declared that convenience stores, corner markets, gas stations, bodegas, and “other
similar businesses” would be exempt because those places are subject to inspection by the New
York State Department of Agriculture and Markets (“Department of Agriculture”) and not under
BOH control due to the Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) between the two
departments.60
In addition, the BOH counts as a single serving two and three liter bottles.61 If the goal is
to limit portion sizes to encourage healthier choices and reduce obesity rates, how does counting
a two or three liter bottle as a single serving accomplish that goal? Furthermore, during the
proceedings in the New York Supreme Court, the BOH decided that it would allow 17-ounce

56

24 R.C.N.Y. §§ 81.53(3)(b-c).
24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53(1)(A).
58
Brief for Respondents – Appellants, supra note 28, at 27-8; Matter of N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic
Chambers of Commerce, 2013 A.D. at 9.
59
24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53(2) (emphasis added); Janet Kinosian, Overwhelmed by Milk Substitutes?, AARP (Aug. 15,
2012), http://www.aarp.org/health/healthy-living/info-08-2012/milk-substitutes-five-healthy-choices.html.
60
Food Preparation and Food Establishments, Definitions, 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.03(s) (defining a food service
establishment as “[A] place where food is provided for individual portion service directly to the consumer whether
such food is provided free of charge or sold, and whether consumption occurs on or off the premises or is provided
from a pushcart, stand or vehicle.”); Brief for Plaintiffs-Petitioners at 11, In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic
Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2013 A.D. 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (No.
653584/12); In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 A.D. at 9-10.
61
Brief for Plaintiffs-Petitioners, supra note 60, at 49.
57
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cups thus changing the prior prohibition on 16.9-ounce bottles.62 This change to accommodate
current bottle sizes in the middle of a trial exemplifies a critical issue with the ban: its arbitrary
and capricious nature. As a rule, 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53 has so many exceptions that it truly does
not prevent people from consuming more than 16-ounces of what the BOH and former Mayor
Bloomberg considered to be a sugary drink.
Part III: By Passing the Ban the BOH Has Exceeded Its Statutory Authority
Administrative agencies do not have the same lawmaking or legislative power that has been
vested with the legislature. The New York State Constitution provides for a separation of powers
between the legislative and executive branches of local government.63 Courts have consistently
respected the individual powers of each branch of government, requiring that neither branch
invade the powers of the others.64 In New York City, the New York City Charter further protects
this by vesting the City’s legislative power with the City Council and providing for distinct
legislative and executive branches.65 It is the Mayor of New York who embodies the executive
branch and has been granted the power to appoint heads of administrations and departments.66
Even though the Mayor is empowered to “implement and enforce legislative pronouncements
emanating from the Council…the Mayor ‘may not go beyond stated legislative policy and
prescribe a remedial device not embraced by the policy.’”67 In order for the Mayor to be able to

62

Id.
N.Y. Const. art. IX § 1(a) (“Every local government… [S]hall have a legislative body elective by the people
thereof.”).
64
Subcontractors Trade Ass’n v. Koch, 61 N.Y.2d 422, 427 (N.Y. 1984).
65
Id.; Under 21, Catholic Home Bureau for Dependent Children v. New York, 65 N.Y.2d 344, 356 (N.Y.) (1985);
N.Y.C. Charter § 21 (1989).
66
N.Y.C. Charter § 3 (1988); N.Y.C. Charter § 6 (1967).
67
Subcontractors Trade Ass’n, 61 N.Y.2d at 427 (quoting In re Broidrick v. Lindsay, 39 N.Y.2d 642, 645-6 (N.Y.
1976)).
63
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devise plans to fix social problems, it is the legislature that must first delegate that power to the
Mayor.68
Through the New York City Charter, the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene has the
jurisdiction to “regulate all matters affecting health in the city of New York… perform all those
functions and operations performed by the city that relate to the health of the people of the
city.”69 Specifically, N.Y.C. Charter § 556 gives the BOH the power to regulate and supervise
the milk and water supplies, determine the public health needs of the city, supervise and control
communicable and chronic diseases, “supervise and regulate the food and drug supply of the
city,” and promote or provide for public education and programs.70 Furthermore, N.Y.C. Charter
§ 558 gives the BOH the power to “add to and alter, amend or repeal any part of the health code,
and may therein publish additional provisions for security of life and health in the city and confer
additional powers on the department not inconsistent with the constitution, laws of this state.”71
The City argued that the BOH has legislative authority and the ability to issue substantive
rules and standards in public health, citing Charters §§ 556 and 558.72 The City further argued
that the BOH was given plenary powers of legislation by the New York City Charter Revision
Commission.73 Citing cases decided before the 1989 amendments to the City Charter, the City
argued that the Court of Appeals had recognized the plenary powers of the BOH to act “in a
legislative capacity under State legislative authority.”74 In particular, the City cited to Grossman
v. Baumgartner to underscore their position that the BOH has legislative power. 75 While
Grossman did recognize that the Legislature “intended the Board to be the sole legislative
68

Id. at 429.
N.Y.C. Charter § 556 (1988).
70
N.Y.C. Charter §§ 556(c)(9), 556(d)(4-7).
71
N.Y.C. Charter § 558(b) (1979).
72
Brief for Respondents - Appellants, supra note 28, at 17.
73
Id. at 18.
74
Id. at 20.
75
Id. at 21.
69
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authority within the City of New York in the field of health regulation,” this was tempered with
the recognition that the regulations should not be “inconsistent with or contrary to State laws
dealing with the same subject matter.” 76
Nevertheless, the health issue in Grossman was the direct link between tattooing and
hepatitis and, again, this was decided before the 1989 amendment to the New York City Charter
and before the 1979 amendment to N.Y.C. Charter § 558 clarifying the scope of the BOH’s
power. 77 In addition, unlike legislation enacted by the City Council or State Assembly, but
consistent with other administrative actions, the BOH’s rules are subject to arbitrary and
capricious review under Article 78.78 Furthermore, the BOH is subject to oversight by the State
Public Health Council, Commissioner, and the Department of Health: departments that do not
have any legislative ability or powers.79 It is difficult to understand how a board that is subject to
oversight by non-legislative bodies can itself wield legislative powers.
The dissent from the Court of Appeals of New York, however, advocated the position that
the City’s approaches to public health support the BOH’s position due to the broad authority it
had been given in the past and its “special structure” to address health issues expeditiously. 80 The
dissent further noted that New York’s highest court has characterized the BOH’s powers as
legislative in the past and viewed the BOH’s authority as nearly legislative. 81 Judge Read
continued by articulating that the prior amendments did not switch the BOH’s “source of

76

Grossman v. Baumgartner, 17 N.Y.2d 345, 351 (N.Y. 1966); Brief for Respondents - Appellants, supra note 28, at
21.
77
Grossman, 17 N.Y.2d at 349; Brief for Plaintiff - Petitioners, supra note 60, at 21(citing the Report of the Comm.
on Health in Favor of Approving and Adopting a Local Law to Amend the N.Y.C. Charter in relation to Defining
Powers of the Board of Health (1979) to show a concern for separation of powers: “[R]egulations passed by the
Board of Health may be overly broad and so invade the providence of the City Council’s legislative authority.”).
78
Patgin Carriages Co. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene, 28 Misc. 3d 1229(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
79
Brief for Plaintiff - Petitioners, supra note 60, at 22-23.
80 In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2014 N.Y. at *30.
81 Id. at *39-41.
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delegated powers from state legislature to the Council.”82 Moreover, Judge Read opined that the
history of the BOH to regulate public health leads to the only conclusion that its regulations have
“force and effect of state law” and therefore it is not required for the Council to authorize the
regulation of sugary drinks.83
The majority disagreed holding that the City Charter gave only regulatory and not legislative
authority to the BOH.84 The majority continued that the Charter never granted the BOH authority
to make laws and the 1979 amendments were made precisely to ensure that the BOH was not
regulating too broadly and invading the legislative authority of the City Council.85 The majority
reinforced this position by stating that “a rule had the force of law but it is not a law.”86
Courts have agreed that the legislature may delegate its regulatory powers to administrative
agencies, but that must be done “in light of the limitations that the Constitution imposes.”87 Even
though it has been recognized that administrative agencies may be given the authority “to fill in
details and interstices and to make subsidiary policy choices consistent with the enabling
legislation,” creating a new rule is not interstitial.88 It is well settled law that when the executive,
here former Mayor Bloomberg and the BOH, acts “inconsistently with the Legislature or usurps
its prerogatives” the principle of separation of powers is violated. 89 Because the Court of
Appeals of New York majority found that the BOH’s authority is regulatory not legislative, they
continued to the issue of whether the BOH exceeded its regulatory authority by promulgating the

Id. at *44.
Id. at *44-45.
84 Id. at *10.
85 In re N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2014 N.Y. at *11-12.
86 Id. at *13.
87
Boreali v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y.2d 1, 9 (N.Y. 1987) (landmark case in NY deciding if a regulation violates separation
of powers, there is a four factor test that came out of this case).
88
Dorst v. Pataki, 90 N.Y.2d 696, 699 (N.Y. 1977) (quoting In re Citizens For An Orderly Energy Policy v. Cuomo,
78 N.Y.2d 398, 410 (N.Y. 1991))(emphasis added).
89
Clark v. Cuomo, 66 N.Y. 2d 185, 189 (N.Y. 1985).
82
83
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Portion Cap Rule.90 This is in contrast to what the dissent found as the only issue in the case:
whether the BOH acted within the bounds of its state delegated powers.91
However, as the majority from the Court of Appeals of New York found, the Portion Cap
Rule was legislation masquerading as a ban under the BOH. Only the City Council and the State
Assembly can pass legislation in the city and state of New York.
Part IV: The Soda Ban is Ultra Vires under the Boreali four factor test for separation of powers.
The leading case in New York to determine if a restriction or board action was properly
adopted by an administrative agency and did not violate separation of powers is Boreali v.
Axelrod.92 The issue in Boreali was whether the Public Health Council overstepped its delegated
authority when it promulgated a comprehensive code to govern tobacco smoking in open public
areas.93 The court created a four-factor analysis to determine if the administrative agency did
violate separation of powers when enacting the new tobacco code.94 The first factor considered is
if the regulatory scheme was “laden with exceptions based solely upon economic and social
concerns.”95 The second is did the agency create “its own comprehensive set of rules without
legislative guidance.”96 The third factor is did the agency act “in an area in which the Legislature
had repeatedly tried -- and failed -- to reach agreement in the face of substantial public debate
and vigorous lobbying by a variety of interested factions.”97 The fourth and final factor to be
considered is if there was any “special expertise or technical competence in the field of health”
involved in developing the regulation being challenged.98 When creating this test, the court was
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foremost concerned about not allowing the legislature to cede its policy-making responsibility to
an administrative agency, or to have an administrative agency seize power reserved for the
legislature.99
In Boreali, because the tobacco code failed the four-factor analysis, the Public Health
Council was deemed to have “exceeded the permissible scope of its mandate by using it as a
basis for engaging in inherently legislative activities.”100 For an agency to have exceeded its
mandated authority, it is not necessary to have violated all four factors, but when the factors,
viewed in combination, show that the agency engaged in a policy-making activity, this is found
to be in violation of separation of powers.101 Once an agency engages in policy-making in an
area where it has not been delegated authority, the agency has acted as the legislature and a
regulation that violates separation of powers will be deemed invalid.102
A. Did the ban balance competing concerns of public health and economic costs?103
The presence of exemptions in this case is particularly telling when deciding the first
Boreali factor against the former Mayor and BOH.104 This is because “exemptions typically run
counter to such goals and cannot be justified as simple implementations of legislative values.”105
It could not be said that the BOH acted solely with a view towards public health when the
exemptions were taken into account.106 The exemptions listed in the ban regulate where someone
can purchase large sugary drinks and what kind of large sugary drink they are purchasing.107
Exempting grocery stores, convenience stores, corner markets, and gas stations but not movie
99
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theaters, stadiums, or food trucks shows that in creating the rule the BOH weighed the potential
benefits of obesity reduction with the economic impact upon these industries if they were not
able to sell large sugary drinks.108 The same can be said for the exemption given to alcoholic
beverages and milkshakes, some of which contain more sugar and calories than the large portion
sodas.109
The BOH defended these considerations by claiming that they are outside the scope of
BOH regulations due to an MOU between the State Department of Health and the State
Department of Agriculture and Markets. 110 The City further argued that sodas mixed with
alcohol are also exempt because it is the New York State Alcoholic Beverage Control Law that
regulates the sale of alcohol thus making it outside the scope of the BOH’s authority. 111
However, the MOU cited calls for cooperative efforts among the agencies to assure food
protection; there was no cooperation between agencies upon creating and implementing the
ban.112 Moreover, the BOH has always retained the right to “apply generally applicable rules to
alcohol and the establishments that serve it” by law.113
Further proof of the weighing of economic factors against potential health benefits was
found in the Health Commissioner’s own words.114 The Health Commissioner “went as far as to
indicate that in addition to promoting health, the ban would help ameliorate obesity-related
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health care expenditures in New York.”115 The exemptions written into the rule show that the
BOH compromised between competing social and economic concerns and private interests. The
most notable of private interest exemptions is the ubiquitous 7-11 Big Gulp, which comes in
sizes ranging from 20–50-ounces.116 7-11 received an exemption for its 50-ounce Double Big
Gulp, which can have about 600 calories when filled with Coca-Cola, because it is a convenience
store.117 The Court of Appeals of New York was not convinced that the exemptions in the rule
were solely health related because the adoption of the Portion Cap Rule or “an outright
prohibition of sugary beverages, that interferes with commonplace daily activities preferred by
large numbers of people must necessarily wrestle with complex value judgments concerning
personal autonomy and economics. That is policy-making, not rule-making.”118
The BOH claimed that the regulation of FSEs to protect health has long been a core goal
of the agency.119 However the BOH also admitted that, traditionally, the scope of power it had
was with infectious diseases; it was in 2006 where the BOH expanded its scope to chronic
diseases by regulating artificial trans fats.120 The goal of the soda ban was to discourage New
Yorkers from consuming sugary drinks by placing a maximum on the possible size that could be
ordered.121 This looked beyond health benefits and concerns by attempting to manipulate choices
available to consumers.122 As the Court of Appeals of New York found, there were other ways
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the BOH could have approached reducing soda intake besides banning some large sugary drinks
in some FSEs.123
This also ventured into lawmaking, something within the realm of the State Assembly
and the City Council but not the BOH or the Mayor’s office. 124 What the BOH was doing with
the rule was making soda or sugary drinks a more expensive choice for consumers by forcing
them to purchase two 16-ounce cups instead of one 32-ounce cup. 125 By influencing, or
attempting to influence, decisions that consumers make about their beverage choice and size, the
Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division found that the decision by the BOH to regulate
a product that was never categorized as dangerous is inherently a policy decision and thus for the
Legislature to determine and not the BOH. 126 The Supreme Court of New York Appellate
Division further found that the ban was “especially suited for legislative determination as it
involves ‘difficult social problems’ which must be resolved by ‘making choices among
competing ends.’”127 In other words, when weighing health concerns, consumer diet choices, and
business financial interests, all the courts of New York determined that the task is best left to the
Legislature to determine the best course of action to take, not the BOH or Mayor’s office. 128
Judge Read’s dissent argued that there is “no obvious reason why ‘economic
consequences,’ ‘tax implications for small business owners’ and ‘personal autonomy’ are
‘ends.’”129 Judge Read believed that these were factors the BOH properly must take into account
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when determining the best way to obtain its public health goals. 130 Judge Read further
determined that the BOH’s decision was the result of a cost benefit analysis that is performed
daily and the “ends-means test” the majority notes under the first Boreali factor has no legal
basis.131 Judge Read argued that the “proper standard for our review is whether the regulation is
so lacking in reason for its promulgation that it is essentially arbitrary” and that the Portion Cap
Rule passed the test.132
However, the abundance of exemptions and the failure of the BOH to work cooperatively
with the Department of Agriculture were indicative of the fact that more than the health concerns
of New Yorkers were being considered when the Portion Cap Rule was written.133 The BOH,
when writing the rule, took into account non-health policy considerations effectively failing the
first Boreali factor.134
B. Did the agency write on a clean slate creating its own comprehensive set of rules without
benefit of legislative guidance?135
The second Boreali factor asks if the BOH wrote on a clean slate when it created the
Portion Cap Rule. Administrative agencies are permitted to engage in interstitial rule-making.
This occurs when an agency fills in the details of a broad legislative mandate to make it
operational; when the agency goes beyond filling in it exceeds its limits on authority.136 In this
case there was no existing gap that needed to be filled in by the Portion Cap Rule.
The City cites the N.Y.C. Charter as giving the BOH a broad grant of general and
specific authority to “regulate all matters affecting the health in the city of New York.” 137
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Additionally, the Charter states that the BOH has the power to “supervise the reporting and
control of communicable and chronic diseases and conditions hazardous to life and health” and
to “supervise and regulate the food and drug supply of the city.” 138 Although the Court has
upheld broad grants of authority to administrative agencies in the past, those cases were found to
not have the same circumstances found in Boreali or did not have the exemptions that are present
throughout the Portion Cap Rule.139 To further bolster the City’s position that the Portion Cap
Rule did not write on a clean slate, the City cites 24 R.C.N.Y. § 47.61, which establishes
nutrition requirements for group day care facilities. 140 Section 47.61, similar to the soda ban,
limits the types of beverages that can be served to children. No child is to receive any beverage
with “added sweeteners, artificial or natural,” children cannot be served more than “six (6)
ounces of 100% juice per day,” and children age two and older can only be served “milk with
1% or less milk-fat unless milk with a higher fat content is medically required.”141
However, this rule affects all group day care facilities in N.Y.C. and does not affect sizes
available for purchase by consumers. 142 Merely because there is rule affecting beverages
available to children in controlled settings that does not provide the gap that is needed for the
soda ban to pass the Boreali factors. The soda ban was written on a clean slate because it targets
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consumer choices in only some FSEs.143 24 R.C.N.Y. § 47.67 does not have any gaps that the
soda ban fills in.
The State Assembly and City Council have struck down prior attempts to regulate soda;
neither body has adopted a statute defining any policy toward soda consumption.144 The majority
in the Court of Appeals of New York found that creating “an entirely new rule that significantly
changes the manner in which sugary beverages are provided to customers at eating
establishments is not an auxiliary selection of means to an end: it reflects a new policy
choice.” 145 The majority found that the BOH wrote the Portion Cap Rule without legislative
guidance and did not fill in any independent legislation gaps.146 By enacting the Portion Cap
Rule, the BOH wrote on a clean slate violating the second Boreali factor.
C. Is the agency acting in an area that the legislature has repeatedly tried and failed to reach
agreement?147
If the legislature appears unable to agree on a way to solve a problem, or has repeatedly
tried and failed, an agency cannot attempt to fill what it sees as a vacuum and impose its own
solution. 148 Nonetheless, there is a distinction drawn between failed legislative action and
legislative inaction. Inaction will not violate the Boreali factor, but failed legislative action
will.149 In New York City and New York State, there have been several prior attempts to target
sugary drinks and sodas.150 In the City, there were resolutions attempting to place warning labels
on sugar sweetened beverages, to add certain sugary drinks to prohibited goods available for
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food stamp purchase, and even to add an excise tax on sugar sweetened beverages, all of which
failed.151 At the state level there were bills to prohibit the sale of sugary drinks on government
property and to prohibit stores with ten or more employees from displaying candy or sugary
drinks in the check out aisle, among many others.152 In all cases, the bills failed.
The Portion Cap Rule attempted to achieve the same result as the prior bills, but in a
different manner: by limiting the size that can be purchased.153 Thus, it is addressing the same
policy area that the City Council and State Assemblies in New York City and State have already
rejected.154 The majority in the Court of Appeals of New York found that inaction on the part of
both legislatures constituted additional evidence that the Portion Cap Rule was new policy and
not “preexisting legislative policy.”155 Because it is an area where the Legislatures, both city and
state, tried and failed to reach an agreement, the Portion Cap Rule violated the third Boreali
factor.
D. Was special expertise or technical competence used in the development of the ban?156
In deciding if there was special or technical competence used in formulating the ban,
there was a split between the trial and appellate divisions. The Supreme Court of New York
Appellate Division reasoned that because the board did not use any special expertise or technical
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competence in developing the rule that it violated the final Boreali factor. 157 No expert was
brought in to create the Portion Cap Rule. The Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division
found it dispositive that the rule was enacted without any change from its drafting by the
Mayor’s office.158
However, the Supreme Court of New York found that the BOH’s choice to not make
changes demonstrated an agreement with the language, not a failure to exercise expertise or
technical competence.159 The Supreme Court of New York reasoned that those persons on the
BOH have the expertise or technical competence needed to be able to enact a portion cap on
sugary drinks. 160 The Supreme Court of New York further articulated that the development
requirement of Boreali does not require an agency to draft its own regulations.161 An agency can
demonstrate expertise and technical competence when, upon challenge, it can show where and
how the expertise and technical competence was exercised.162
The majority in the Court of Appeals of New York found no need to address this part of
the Boreali test.163 The majority noted that this was not done with the intent to imply that the
fourth factor was insignificant, merely that “the fact that the rule was adopted with very little
technical discussion” could alert the courts to a policy-making intent of a regulation.164
E. Do All Four Factors Need to Be Present to Violate Boreali?
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One of the issues the City raised in its Motion for Leave to Appeal is whether all four
factors of the test are required and, if not, how should the factors, once found, be weighed.165
Boreali itself stated that none of the four factors alone is sufficient to conclude that the
administrative body usurped the legislature’s power, but that “all of these circumstances, when
viewed in combination, paint a portrait of an agency that has improperly assumed for
itself…[that] which characterizes the elected Legislature’s role in our system of government.”166
The Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division interpreted this to mean that the four
factors are to be interpreted as “indicators of the usurpation of the legislature, rather than a
talismanic rule of four required elements that must all be present in every case.”167
At the trial level, the Supreme Court of New York did not find that all four Boreali
factors were violated, only three, and yet still found that the rule could not be upheld.168 Contrary
to the City’s position, the Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division is not the first to state
that all four factors do not need to be present to invalidate a rule because the Boreali Court stated
it when they made their ruling.169 The majority in the Court of Appeals of New York reiterated
their position that it is all of the circumstances, when viewed together, that will determine
whether an agency engaged in policy-making.170
F. Arbitrary and Capricious Nature of the Ban
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Because the Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals of
New York both found that the ban violated separation of powers and the Boreali test, those
Courts did not discuss the arbitrary and capricious nature of the ban.171
The Supreme Court of New York, however, did discuss whether the ban was arbitrary
and capricious. The Court first looked at whether the ban was reasonable.172 For a ban to be
reasonable the BOH only needed to demonstrate a reasonable basis for the Portion Cap Rule.173
This requirement was met and the ban was considered reasonable. 174 Yet, the ban’s uneven
enforcement within a city block paired with its exemptions defeated the stated purpose of the
ban.175
The ban does not apply to all FSEs leading to the inability to purchase a large soda at a
restaurant but the ability to go next door to a corner market and purchase a large soda there.176
Even Jon Stewart noted the particular ludicrousness of this by stating that convenience stores
were not regulated because “It’s magic.” 177 While the BOH countered that according to the
MOU, the government is not required to address all facets of a problem at once, the ban was still
deemed to be arbitrary due to its unevenness.178
The ban also excluded beverages that have significantly higher concentrations of sugar
sweeteners or calories and placed no limitations on refills, exclusions which also defeated the
stated purpose of the ban.179 The BOH argued that convenience drives food purchases and if it is
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harder to carry more cups people will not do so, but this implied that the rule was designed to
make consumption a conscious and informed choice.180 These are considerations that the BOH is
not supposed to weigh when formulating a rule. The Court argued that these exemptions defeated
the purpose of the rule and “gut” it.181 If the goal is to reduce obesity rates in the city, allowing
large sugary drinks to remain available at some stores and not others defeats entirely the purpose
of the ban.
Part V: The 14th Amendment and Fundamental Liberty Right Concerns
The proper constitutional framework, and issue in this case, is whether the BOH, when
creating the Portion Cap Rule, exceeded its statutory authority and encroached on inherent
legislative responsibilities thus violating separation of powers. Before a fundamental liberty right
can be claimed, the rule, legislation, or law, must clear separation of powers hurdles. Separation
of powers is a concept that has been expressly provided for in the N.Y.C. Charter and is
considered to be vital to principles of freedom. 182 The Portion Cap Rule clearly violates
separation of powers in New York City due to former Mayor Bloomberg and the BOH’s attempt
to usurp the authority of the City Council.183
However, even though the case was not about fundamental liberty right concerns, much
of the rhetoric about it, particularly in the media, was centered on fundamental liberty right
concerns and interests.184 Even Amy Poehler’s hit sitcom, Parks and Recreation, entered the
collective discussion by having an episode focused solely on a soda ban Leslie Knope was
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attempting to enact that was similar to the Portion Cap Rule in New York City.185 Generally
speaking, a statute will be determined to be unconstitutional if it violates a right guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights or is a fundamental right that has not been expressly provided for in the
Constitution. 186 When determining if something qualifies as a fundamental liberty right not
expressly guaranteed, the courts look to whether it is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered
liberty and system of justice.”187 Accepting the rhetoric that the Portion Cap Rule was infringing
on the fundamental liberty right of people to drink as much soda as they wanted, the scrutiny
level applied would be strict scrutiny review.188
Applying strict scrutiny review requires for the government interest in the right to be
compelling and the manner in which it is carried out to be narrowly tailored to advance the
state’s compelling interest.189 Even though it can be argued that the government has a compelling
interest in the health of its citizens, in particular those who are obese due to the cost on the
healthcare system, the rule was not narrowly tailored enough to pass strict scrutiny. Due to what
the Supreme Court of New York found to make the ban arbitrary and capricious, these same
items would imply that the ban was not narrowly tailored to meet the compelling interest of the
state.190 Because the ban was not a complete citywide ban but only affected certain FSEs, it
cannot be argued that it was sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass strict scrutiny. If a person can
go to a store less than 10 feet away and purchase a soda larger than what the ban prohibits
merely because the establishment does not qualify as an FSE under the Portion Cap Rule, how
can the ban be tailored enough to advance the state’s compelling interest in the health of its
185
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citizens? The factors that make the ban arbitrary and capricious are the same factors that would
lead to the ban failing a fundamental liberty right claim because it is not narrowly tailored.
However, as much as pundits and the media would like this to be the issue, the actual issue is
that the ban violated separation of powers and is legislation that was masked as an administrative
action.191
Conclusion:
The separation of powers doctrine is important to this country at a state and federal level.
It ensures that there are checks and balances in the governing system. The Portion Cap Rule was
legislation that an executive agency was trying to pass off as an additional rule to the health code
of New York City. Executive agencies cannot create laws or do more than what the legislature
has given them allowance to do. The Soda Ban definitively did not pass three of the Boreali
factors from the four-part test to determine if an executive or agency action crossed the line into
legislative territory and was policy-making. In addition, the ban itself with its many exemptions
led to it being arbitrary and capricious. The City cited no examples of how it would lead to
people making better choices beyond their reliance on the assumption that people would not
walk next door or across the street to get a 32 or more ounce soda. To truly enact a large sugary
drink ban, as former Mayor Bloomberg wanted to, it is necessary for the Board of Health to
either wait for signs from the City Council that they are ready to pass legislation on the topic or
remove the exemptions and do a complete citywide ban without any FSE exemptions. Waiting or
enacting a complete citywide ban are the only ways in which a large sugary drink ban will ever
pass separation of powers, not be arbitrary and capricious, and will begin to reduce sugary drink
consumption, and obesity rates, in New York City.
191

This is evidenced by the fact that none of the briefs argued a fundamental liberty right issue, only that the ban
violates separation of powers in New York due to the four factor test established in Boreali v. Axelrod and is
arbitrary and capricious.
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